Incompatibility in markets with network effects reduces consumers' ability to "mix and match" components offered by different sellers, but can also spur changes in product attributes that might benefit consumers. In this paper, we estimate the effects of incompatibility on consumers in a classic hardware/software market: ATM cards and machines. We find that ATM fees ceteris paribus reduce the network benefit from other banks' ATMs. However, a surge in ATM deployment accompanies the shift to surcharging. Even under conservative assumptions regarding how much of the surge is directly attributable to surcharging, greater deployment often completely offsets the harm from higher fees. The results suggest that policy discussions of incompatibility must consider not only its direct effect on consumers, but also its effect on product attributes.
Introduction
The last two decades have witnessed a dramatic increase in the importance of markets with network effects. 1 In these markets, the effect of incompatibility between "platforms" sold by separate firms is a central policy concern, and one on which theory is ambiguous. To illustrate, one can easily imagine that incompatibility between competing video game consoles reduces welfare by preventing one platform's console owners from using the other's proprietary game software. However, incompatibility strengthens the incentives to develop such software-because outstanding software attracts customers from competing platforms. Ultimately, this might benefit consumers. It is this tension that we examine here: Incompatibility reduces consumers' options for cross-platform matching, but may also lead platform owners to change their product attributes in ways that improve welfare. 2 Our empirical setting is a classic "hardware/software" industry: Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) and ATM cards. In this market, network effects arise because consumers can use ATM cards and ATMs owned by different banks. However, banks impose fees for such "mix and match" transactions, introducing partial incompatibility between cards and competitors' machines. To continue the analogy above, with zero ATM fees, consumers may freely match hardware (cards) and software (ATMs) offered by different platforms (banks). Fees reduce or eliminate this ability. Our data display both crosssectional and time-series variation in this fee-based measure of incompatibility, providing a rare opportunity to observe its effects. We also observe changes in the sizes of banks' ATM fleets. This allows us to estimate not only the direct effect of incompatibility on cross-platform matching, but also the second effect: shifts in product attributes, as represented by increased ATM deployment. The key empirical question that we examine is whether on balance the shift toward incompatibility leaves consumers better or worse off.
Our data have several strengths for such an analysis. We conduct our empirical work using ATM-related data for banks operating in different local markets throughout the United States. Our data cover the period 1994-1999, containing roughly ten thousand bank by county by year observations. Each observation contains information regarding the bank's ATMs and ATM fees, as well as the number of competitors' ATMs available to customers and their fees. It also contains information regarding deposit account (ATM card) prices and market shares, as well as characteristics associated with these accounts. Thus, we possess panel data on prices, quantities and characteristics for both components of the network good, as well as a measure of incompatibility. Our data also contain a relatively discrete move toward incompatibility after 1996, when banks began imposing surcharges on foreign transactions made by noncustomers on their ATMs.
The empirical approach involves estimating a structural model of consumer demand for deposit accounts (ATM cards) as a function of deposit account prices, ATM fees, ATM density and other bank characteristics. The model allows us to estimate consumers' willingness to pay for deposit accounts, and the influence of ATMs on willingness to pay. It also allows us to estimate the indirect network effect: the relationship between willingness to pay for an account and competitors' ATM fleet size. Finally, we estimate the relationship between willingness to pay for deposit accounts and competitors' ATM fees; this captures the effect of incompatibility.
The estimated parameters from this model provide the basis for our welfare analysis. The first component of the welfare effect is the partial equilibrium reduction in consumer welfare resulting from the shift toward incompatibility. Our results suggest that incompatibility ceteris paribus harms consumers during our sample. We also provide a fuller estimate that incorporates changes in ATM deployment-both for a given bank's own ATMs and its competitors' ATMs. It is often argued that ATM deployment increases with surcharging, providing benefits to customers that in some cases completely offset the reduction in welfare associated with incompatibility. Recent work using other data from ATM markets has indeed found such links between surcharging and deployment. 3 To examine this issue we estimate a conservative figure for surcharging-related changes in deployment (on the low end relative to that found in related work), and examine the welfare implications. Even this conservative estimate suggests that in many geographic areas greater ATM deployment provides benefits that completely offset the losses from higher fees. Roughly stated, the net effects on welfare are more likely to be positive in urban areas, and more likely to be negative in rural areas. We also estimate split sample specifications that allow the demand parameters to vary by local market population density. We find that the network effects associated with ATMs and cards are much stronger in areas with high population density. This is consistent with the idea that in areas with high travel costs, ATM access is more valuable to consumers. Using the parameters from the split samples, we find that welfare changes in low density markets are negative, while welfare changes in high-density areas average roughly fourteen percent.
To our knowledge, ours is the one of the first empirical studies linking incompatibility, product attributes and consumer welfare within a market characterized by indirect network effects. To date, most research has examined the value of compatibility across different products in markets with direct network effects. 4 It also has focused on instances where compatibility between products remains fixed over time, relying on cross-sectional variation in compatibility for identification. While this other work is important, most policy discussions of incompatibility involve forcing compatibility within a given market, making within-market analysis or primary importance. Our work also relates to a developing literature establishing empirical relationships in markets with indirect network effects, although typically this work examines markets in which compatibility between different systems is fixed. 5 More specifically, this paper adds to the rapidly growing empirical literature on ATM fees. Hannan et al. (2003) establish that large banks charge higher surcharges, using data from 1998, and also find that large banks are more likely to impose surcharges in markets with a high inflow of new customers. Prager (2001) and Hannan (2005) examine the link between surcharging and deposit market structure, focusing on whether large banks benefit relative to small banks; Prager finds no such link for an early period, while Hannan finds evidence that large banks gain share and concentration rises using later data. Massoud, Saunders and Scholnick (2006) conduct similar tests correlating surcharges with changes in deposit market outcomes, finding a positive correlation between surcharges and gains in deposit share for large banks. Stango (2004, 2006) show that surcharging and deposit account prices are linked and that surcharging appears linked to a "strategic" motive involving creating incompatibility as a way of generating competitive advantage. And, work by Hannan and Borzekowski (2006) and Gowrisankaran and Krainer (2004) shows that surcharging is correlated with increases in ATM 4 Gandal (1994 Gandal ( , 1995 and Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (1996) find that computer spreadsheets compatible with the Lotus system commanded higher prices during the early 1990s. 5 Gandal, Greenstein and Salant (1999) study the link between operating system values and software availability in the early days of the microcomputer market. They find evidence supporting the existence of complementary feedback between hardware and software availability. More recent work by Gandal, Kende and Rob (2002) deployment. Finally, a recent structural analysis by Ishii (2005) conducts an analysis similar in spirit to that in this paper, though using different data. Ishii (2005) finds that the data fit a model where consumers value ATMs and ATM access and consider both when making their deposit account decisions; she also finds an economically significant role for strategic incompatibility.
ATMs, ATM Cards and ATM Fees
ATMs allow bank customers to perform financial transactions electronically. ATMs initially served banks' desires to cut costs by automating tasks performed by bank tellers. While ATMs can in principle perform more complex transactions such as deposits or loan payments, the most common transaction is a cash withdrawal. 6 Banks locate or deploy ATMs both "on-premise" at branches, and "off-premise" at other locations likely to generate significant transaction volume. Independent Service Operators (ISOs) also deploy ATMs, typically in lower-volume locations such as convenience stores, restaurants and bars.
Banks grant consumers access to their ATMs by providing ATM cards with checking (demand deposit) accounts. The deposit account also carries other services, such as check-writing and direct deposit for paychecks. Banks are differentiated both horizontally through geography, and vertically through service quality. Survey evidence suggests that the most important account features in determining customer attraction and retention are service quality and ATM/branch location. 7 Customers also may value purchasing other financial services such as loans or brokerage services from their depository institution; the breadth of these offerings is therefore a source of both horizontal and vertical differentiation.
Customers pay both implicit and explicit prices on deposit accounts. The implicit price is the opportunity cost of holding cash in a non-interest bearing account, or earning an interest rate below the risk-free rate if the checking account pays interest. Explicit costs may include a monthly service charge, fees associated with transactions (such as check-writing), and penalty fees such as NSF (insufficient funds) fees. Banks often offer customers a menu of options, trading lower explicit fees or interest payments for higher minimum balances. 6 Dove Consulting (1999, 2002) finds that in both 1999 and 2002, roughly eighty percent of ATM transactions were cash withdrawals. Deposits and inquiries comprise roughly ten percent each. 7 See Stavins (1999) and Kiser (2003) for discussions of account characteristics valued by banking customers.
The menus are usually determined at the bank level, and identical across all branches for that bank. While total account prices for any one customer may vary in principle depending on their pricing plan and balances, available survey evidence suggests that these prices are similar for accounts with or without minimum balances, averaging roughly $144 per year. 8 Consumers typically pay no per-transaction fees for ATM transactions made at their own bank's machines. They can also make foreign transactions on other banks' ATMs, because during the 1980s most banks joined "shared networks" that allow consumers to use their card at any ATM owned by a bank in the network. These ATM networks, which were often joint ventures organized by member banks, provide switching services for each foreign transaction made on a member bank's ATM by another member bank's customer. The networks jointly establish a fixed subscription fee for each member bank in the network, a per-transaction switch fee paid by the cardholder's bank to the network, and a per-transaction interchange fee paid by the cardholder's bank to the ATM owner. By the mid-1990s, the growth of shared networks and reciprocity agreements between them allowed an ATM card to function at nearly any ATM in the country.
A foreign transaction may generate a foreign fee paid to the consumer's home bank, and a surcharge paid to the owner of the ATM. Foreign fees exist throughout our sample and remain roughly constant, while surcharges are a more recent phenomenon. Prior to 1996, the major ATM shared networks (PLUS and Cirrus) prohibited banks from imposing surcharges. The major shared networks ostensibly prohibited surcharging in an attempt to build consumer acceptance of foreign transactions. The prohibition on surcharging was challenged by both banks and state legislatures; banks claimed that surcharging would enable them to deploy ATMs in lower-volume locations, while states viewed the ban as a potentially illegal vertical restraint. Prior to 1996, sixteen states overrode the surcharge bans. Furthermore, antitrust actions regarding the surcharge ban were being considered by the Department of Justice. Facing this pressure, the leading networks eliminated the ban. From 1997-1999, most banks adopted surcharges, and they are currently nearly universal. Both foreign fees and surcharges are set at the bank level; it is rare for a bank to set different fees across machines or markets. transaction volume during our sample period 1994-1999. The data illustrate that while foreign fees remain roughly constant throughout our sample period, surcharging becomes much more prevalent after its inception in 1996. 10 Concurrent with the advent of surcharging is an increase in ATM deployment; the average annual growth rate is under fourteen percent from 1993-1996, and nearly eighteen percent after 1996. Transaction volume holds steady after the advent of surcharging, after growing rapidly prior to 1996. This leads to fewer transactions per ATM, a pattern consistent with the notion that the breakeven number of transactions per ATM is much lower if foreign transactions generate surcharge revenue. While hard data are not available, most industry observers also believe that foreign transactions fall over the sample period as well, from roughly forty percent of the total prior to 1996 to roughly thirty percent after 1996.
The Network Economics of ATMs and ATM Cards
In the language of the literature on network economics, ATM cards and machines are a "hardware/software" system. 11 Consumers purchase "hardware" in the form of an ATM card by choosing a bank and establishing an account. ATMs are "software" that allow consumers to assemble a composite good-a financial transaction that is usually a cash withdrawal. This "mix and match" construction of goods is a common feature of emerging technologies, and is analogous to that involved in consumers' matching of computer hardware and software, operating systems and spreadsheets, different components of audio/visual systems, and a variety of other products. 12 In ATM markets, as in many of the aforementioned examples, firms produce both hardware and software, and offer their customers bundles containing both. Thus, a customer establishing an account receives both an ATM card and free access to that bank's ATMs. Our focus in this paper is on estimating consumer welfare. We therefore are concerned primarily with the implications of network effects for consumers' willingness to pay for components of the system-which in our case is the hardware/software bundle offered by banks. Our discussion takes firms' strategic behavior regarding pricing, incompatibility and quality as given, and focuses on the effects of changes in these factors on consumers. This parallels our empirical approach, which uses variation in incompatibility to estimate changes in consumer welfare.
We would expect a consumer's willingness to pay for an account and associated ATM services to depend on the characteristics of the account-service quality, for example, as well as any complementary services offered with the account. One (internalized) indirect network effect in the bundle is that willingness to pay should also depend on the bank's own ATMs. Consumers incur travel costs to use ATMs; therefore, a greater number of local ATMs reduces travel costs and makes an account more attractive. It also means that if consumers value accounts based on which bank has the ATMs closest to "home," more consumers will be closer to an ATM of that bank. The second indirect network effect on willingness to pay is that competitors' ATMs also provide benefits, because ATMs operate on shared networks. While consumers may prefer to use an ATM operated by their own bank (even absent fees, they can perform a wider array of transactions on their own ATMs), they also should value occasional access to other banks' ATMs.
Incompatibility and its Effects
In hardware/software markets, the compatibility issue revolves around whether Firm A's hardware will function with Firm B's software, and vice versa. ATM fees create incompatibility by increasing the cost of access to other banks' ATMs. While surcharges do not render competitors' ATMs fully incompatible, they impose an incremental expense for foreign ATM use. In the language of network economics, this expense is most analogous to an "adaptor fee" paid by software users to achieve compatibility with potentially incompatible hardware.
Generally speaking, there are three effects of incompatibility in such markets. The most general effect is that incompatibility reduces consumers' willingness to pay, ceteris paribus. The strength of this effect depends on the degree to which consumers want to mix and match hardware and software from different sellers. If demand for such transactions is zero, incompatibility leaves consumers unaffected; otherwise, incompatibility reduces aggregate willingness to pay. These effects vary across firms; firms with high demand for mix and match transactions will experience a larger reduction in willingness to pay. In our data, this effect should weaken the relationship between willingness to pay for an ATM card (account) and the number of accessible competitors' ATMs.
A second effect of incompatibility operates through product attributes. With incompatibility, consumers' hardware and software purchases become more tightly linked. Thus, changes in software attributes will have a stronger effect on hardware purchases, increasing the marginal benefit of such investment. These incentives are central to the work of Bernhardt (2002a, 2002b ) modeling competition in ATM markets. High surcharges, the argument goes, induce customers with high demand for foreign transactions to migrate from banks with small ATM fleets to banks with large ATM fleets. This is analogous to arguments regarding incompatibility in the network literature; incompatibility can shift competitive advantage in one market (hardware) by tying consumers' purchases to another market (software). Anecdotally this appears to be the case; the data from Table 1 reveal that within our sample, the annual growth rate of ATMs increased from roughly fourteen percent to over eighteen percent after 1996.
A third effect of incompatibility is that it may change the intensity of competition. Here again theory is ambiguous; models of competition in mix and match markets find that incompatibility may either intensify or weaken price competition. 13 Despite this theoretical ambiguity, our intuition tells us that in ATM markets the advent of surcharging would probably weaken price competition.
14 Without ATM fees of any sort, ATM fleet size is not a source of horizontal or vertical product differentiation. As fees rise, the degree of differentiation also rises, which we would expect to weaken business-stealing opportunities. Our empirical work below should control for such shifts in competitive behavior, although we can not identify the size of such effects.
To summarize, a full analysis of the effects of incompatibility should estimate not only the reduction in utility stemming directly from incompatibility, but also any changes in product attributes and price competition associated with the shift toward incompatibility. From a theoretical perspective it is not clear which effect will dominate. Due to the nature of our data, our approach below is to focus on the direct effects of incompatibility as it operates through ATM fees. This effect is most clearly identified in the data, because the shift to surcharging is so discrete. It is more difficult to precisely quantify the changes in ATM deployment or price competition following surcharging. With this in mind, in the empirical work we present some fairly conservative estimates of the change in ATM deployment and relate these estimates to the demand parameters. While we do not estimate changes in price competition, we discuss such changes later in the paper.
Modeling
In order to measure the effects of incompatibility on consumer welfare, we estimate a structural demand system for deposit account services and ATM usage. This follows techniques made popular by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995). The essence of the empirical approach is to estimate the relationship between consumer utility and product characteristics; specific products are modeled as bundles of characteristics. Under specific assumptions regarding the functional form of preferences on observed and unobserved characteristics, there is a structural relationship between aggregate firm-level market shares and the parameters of consumers' indirect utility functions. This approach is more parsimonious than traditional demand system estimation, as it reduces the large matrix of own-and cross-price elasticities to a smaller matrix of coefficients associated with product characteristics.
Consumer Behavior
In our econometric framework, the fundamental consumer choice is the establishment of a demand deposit (checking) account relationship with a bank. Consumers choose from the set of banks within their county in order to maximize indirect utility. 15 Consumer i's utility for bank j in county k in year t is a function of the price for a deposit account p jt , bank j's observable deposit account characteristics x jkt in county k in year t, the access to ATMs N jkt provided by obtaining an account, the bank's unobservable characteristics ξ j , county level unobservable characteristics ξ k , bank/county unobservable characteristics ξ jk , unobservable year-specific characteristics ξ t and a mean zero term ijkt capturing unobserved consumer heterogeneity. This yields the following specification:
(1) 15 Much of the banking literature uses MSAs and non-MSA counties to approximate local markets. See, e.g., Adams et al. (2005) and Heitfield and Prager (2004) and the references contained in those papers. However, we feel that markets for ATM-related services may be smaller than MSAs, leading us to use the county as the market even in MSAs. We have estimated the model with MSAs as markets with virtually no effect on our results (an unsurprising result given that we have market fixed effects).
While in practice the vector of marginal utility coefficients (α i , β i ) varies by consumer, in this instance we restrict the coefficients to be constant across consumers. By omitting income from the utility function, we are assuming that there are negligible income effects when establishing a deposit account. Given the low share of consumer income devoted to purchasing checking account services, we feel this is reasonable. The assumption is also a function of our data, which do not lend themselves to such an analysis. Our data are measured at the bank/county/year level, but income data are only available at the state/year level.
Deriving the Estimating Equation
As shown by Berry (1994) , if ijkt follows an extreme value distribution and (α i , β i ) are constant across consumers, one can integrate the individual utilities to obtain an estimating equation that provides a structural relationship between the utility parameters and market shares for each firm. Fixing one of the products utilities to be equal to zero (usually the outside good), this yields the following equation:
This is a useful transformation, because while we do not observe individual consumer choices, we do possess bank/county/year observations on market share, prices and other explanatory variables of interest. Note that the consumer-specific heterogeneity has been "integrated out" here, and we are left with the bank/county/year specific term ∆ξ jkt capturing unobserved quality.
While econometrically tractable, the specification of utility that leads to this estimating equation is quite restrictive. A significant limitation is that a proportional increase in all bank prices will not reduce demand for banking services. A common way to guarantee that banks lose market share when prices rise involves choosing an "outside good" to which consumers can switch given an increase in prices by all banks. In our case, we not only observe deposits for banks in each county, but also observe deposits for credit unions; these institutions are imperfect substitutes for banks and are the product to which consumers might conceivably switch given higher bank prices. We therefore treat banks as the "inside good" and credit unions as the outside good.
Another way of enriching the model is to assume that consumers make a two-stage decision, in which they first decide whether to establish an account at a credit union or at a bank. Given that choice, they make their second stage decision regarding which institution to establish an account. This allows for more intuitive substitution patterns, in which a consumer switching away from a bank is more likely to switch to another bank than to a credit union. In a manner similar to that outlined above, one can begin with a general specification in which consumers have heterogeneous preferences for remaining in each "nest." These are also integrated out under specific assumptions regarding the form of the heterogeneity. As Berry (1994) shows, this leads to the following nested logit estimating equation:
The term s okt is the market share of the outside good, whiles j|g is bank j's share of the inside good. The term σ t represents the correlation between consumer choices within each nest; higher values of σ t reflect a higher likelihood that a consumer switching away from one bank will choose another bank rather than a credit union. Letting the term vary by year allows the substitutability between the inside and outside goods to change over time.
Measuring Market Share
We use data from the FDIC Summary of Deposits database to obtain the total deposits held by each bank in each county of operation during our sample period. Similar data from the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) yield deposit data for credit unions, which we use to calculate the share of the outside good. The mean outside good share is roughly twelve percent in our sample, and the interquartile range is [0.01, 0.16]; the share of deposits held by the inside good falls slightly over time as credit unions gain market share. Anecdotally, it also appears that the substitutability of credit unions and banks grows during our sample as well, because credit unions have expanded their service offerings to more closely match those of banks.
One issue associated with our dependent variable is that it is based on total deposits held by each bank. Total deposits include not only checking (deposit) account balances, but also savings and other time deposits such as money markets and CDs. A second issue is that while our model is a discrete choice model, we are proxying the number of accounts with the level of deposits. Thus, total deposit market share may measure checking deposit market share with error. In principle, this can present a problem in our nonlinear framework, even if the measurement error is of a form that is innocuous in more standard linear regressions. However, Ishii (2005) finds that in practice the assumption that deposit and account shares are proportional does not seem to changes the results much relative to a more carefully specified model.
Deposit Account Prices
We take pricing data on deposit accounts from the FDIC Reports of Condition and Income, or Call Reports. These data are available at the card issuer (bank) level. The variable listed in the Call Reports shows annual income from fees associated with deposit accounts. The primary component of such revenue is income from monthly service charges on transaction accounts. It also includes foreign fee income paid by its customers stemming from the use of other issuers' ATMs, and a variety of other fees such as NSF fees for bounced checks and other penalty fees on accounts. To calculate a normalized price for each bank, we divide this value by the end-of-year dollar value of deposits held in transaction accounts. 16 This price measure therefore represents the average revenue per dollar (per year) of transaction account balances. While it undoubtedly averages over the many different fees and fee schedules offered by each bank, this price measure is highly correlated with annual price measures using finer data. 17 This measure omits the additional opportunity cost of holding deposits in checking. We therefore add the average annual fed funds rate to each bank's price, as an approximation of forgone interest income for demand deposit balances. While this does not affect any of our coefficient estimates because they rely on within-bank variation in prices over time, it does provide a useful benchmark for comparing our price measure to others. As a point of comparison, we find that our raw price measure averages roughly $0.01 per dollar of transaction balances, while the cost of funds averages roughly $0.05. The typical checking account has average balances of $1600, implying an annual cost of $96. This figure is in line with other estimates in the banking literature. We have also estimated versions of the model including savings interest rates as a component of prices; the savings rate is not significant in those models, and we exclude it from the models presented below.
The discussion above should make clear that our price variable is subject to measurement error. If this measurement error is fairly constant over time it is not an issue because we use within-bank variation to estimate the model. Fur-thermore, our instrumental variable procedure outlined below should account for measurement error that varies over time. Finally, in other work [Knittel and Stango (2007) ] we estimate a series of hedonic relationships between account prices and characteristics using a wide variety of price measures (such as revenue per account rather than per dollar of balances), and also controlling for bank-level balances per account and other possible influences on measured prices. There is little difference in the empirical results using these different measures.
Specifying the Benefits of ATMs
The access to ATMs associated with an account, N jkt , will depend on bank j's ATM deployment in the local market. It will also depend on the network effects conferred by other banks' ATMs, and the compatibility of those other ATMs. We model this access using the following specification:
The first parameter, b 1 , measures the value of bank j's ATMs in the local market. 18 We measure the ATM variable in logs to capture the declining marginal value of ATMs; the incremental effect of an additional ATM falls with more ATMs in the market, growing negligible as the market becomes saturated.
The second term estimates the value of the indirect network effect associated with the presence of competitors' ATMs. This value is represented by the term [b 2 + b 3 (f jkt + E (sc −j,kt )], where b 2 represents the value of a competitors' ATM with full compatibility (zero surcharges), and b 3 represents the reduction in value from competitors' ATMs caused by own foreign fees and competitors' surcharges. This gives the following specification:
One methodological issue associated with this specification is that the price term p jt includes foreign fee revenue. While in one sense foreign fees are a part of the consumer's expected costs associated with an account, it is also true that foreign fees create incompatibility. While we can not identify the share of p jt driven by foreign fee revenue, we do estimate specifications that omit foreign fees from the incompatibility measure:
Another issue is that while we only observe surcharges in 1997 and beyond, some banks did begin to surcharge prior to that point because they operated in a state that had overridden the ban. We do know which states overrode the ban, allowing us to estimate a specification using a simple dummy variable to measure the transition to surcharging:
where S t is the set of state that overrode the surcharge ban. Thus, b 4 represents the reduction in the indirect network effect associated with competitors' ATMs in the states that overrode the ban prior to 1996, while b 3 measures the effect of incompatibility after 1996. In the main results section below, we report estimates from equation (7). We also report results using the other measures of incompatibility in appendix Table A3 ; the results are qualitatively very similar, although the coefficient on incompatibility is estimated more precisely in our preferred specification.
ATM-Related Data and Measurement Issues
While we possess data on market shares and deposits for the population of banks, we only observe data on ATM fees and deployment for the 300 largest ATM card issuers. While these issuers collectively hold a large share of the total market (for cards or machines), we do not observe such data for smaller issuers. The primary effect of this limitation is to reduce our usable sample size, as we only include in our estimating sample those observations for which we observe both ATM fees and ATM deployment.
Another issue with our ATM data is that while we observe each issuer's total ATM deployment, we do not observe the allocation of that deployment across counties (or at locations within counties). It also stands in direct contrast to the data in Ishii (2005) , which is superior to ours in that it contains ATM location. This prohibits us from explicitly incorporating geography into the structural model, as does Ishii (2005) and some other recent structural work. This is not a problem for single-county issuers, which represent twentyfive percent of our observations. For the other issuers, we assume that banks allocate ATMs across counties in proportion to their branches (which we observe without error from the Summary of Deposits). That is, we use:
This introduces error into our measure of OwnAT Ms jkt . To the extent that the measurement error is constant for a particular bank/county over time, our fixed effects will control for it. However, it is possible that there is timevarying bank/county measurement error. We discuss our approach to this problem below.
Competitors' ATMs also are measured with error, because we do not observe ATM deployment for every bank in each county. 19 We rely on the information we do have regarding competitors' branches to estimate competitors' ATMs, using a regression-based method. We have experimented with several estimation methods, all of which yield similar results, in part because the ATM deployment of smaller issuers is fairly easy to predict; almost all smaller issuers deploy roughly one ATM per branch, with deployment growing slightly over time. In the results shown here, we use a regression-based imputation method that uses data from our observed issuers to fit ATM deployment for other issuers in local markets. In order to estimate the number of ATMs deployed by other institutions, we estimate a within-sample regression of ATMs on branches, year dummies and year/branch interaction terms. To control for the fact that larger institutions have a greater ratio of ATMs to branches, we allow issuer size (in deposits) to affect branches per ATM. We also allow branches per ATM to vary based on whether the issuer is located in an MSA or non-MSA county. We then construct fitted values of ATMs for each institution for which we do not have ATM data. We have experimented with a number of alternative specifications of this model, with essentially no change in the results.
We also face measurement error in constructing a measure of competitors' ATM fees. We use a regression-based method for imputing expected competitors' surcharges. We first estimate the within-sample probability of surcharging and surcharge level (conditional on surcharging) based on issuer size, year effects, MSA dummies and interactions between these variables. We then predict the expected surcharge (probability of surcharging multiplied by expected surcharge) for each competing bank. The expected competitors' surcharge is an average of these and observed surcharges over all competitors in the local market, weighted by each competitors' share of branches in the local market. Again, we have experimented with alternative methods of estimating competitors' fees, with little effect on the results. The shift to surcharging is fairly discrete, meaning that small differences in a prediction of competitors' surcharges are swamped by the change occurring between 1996 and 1998. In fact, using a simple dummy variable indicating whether competitors can impose surcharges yields results very similar to those shown below.
We are left with three independent variables that may be measured with error, meaning that our estimating equation is:
As is well-known, measurement error in an independent variable leads to attenuation bias. 20 A number of methods for correcting attenuation bias exist. We address the measurement error issue by implementing the procedure in Lewbel (1997) , also suggested by Dagenais and Dagenais (1997) . This involves using higher moments of the observable data (the x jkt 's) as instruments for the variables that are measured with error. These instruments will provide consistent estimates of the true parameters if the joint distribution of the variables measured with error is not multivariate normal-in particular, if the distribution is skewed. We report the results that use moments of branch density as instruments. Given that we use branch density to impute countylevel ATM density, there may be some concern that branch density will be correlated with the measurement error. Omitting these instruments does not qualitatively change the results. In the results below, we present both estimates that use this EIV-IV (Error-in-Variables Instrumental Variable) correction and estimates that do not, and discuss their differences. We also conduct some robustness checks using different imputation methods and split samples, which we discuss in the "Alternative Specifications" section below and present in the Appendices.
The specification above omits two variables. First, it omits growth in ATMs deployed by ISOs. Unfortunately we possess no regional data on deployment by these ATM owners. Aggregate data suggest, however, that between 1996 and 1999 the share of ATMs deployed by ISOs grew from nearly zero to roughly ten percent. This implies that our estimates of post-1996 ATM growth are too low; this becomes an issue in Section 5 when we estimate the relationship between surcharging and ATM deployment. We discuss the implications of this when we present the empirical results.
A second limitation is that our specification does not include data regarding the availability of point-of-sale (POS) terminals. These terminals allow consumers to use their debit (ATM) cards to make purchases at retail locations such as supermarkets. Their availability has countervailing influences in our specification. First, the availability of POS terminals would certainly increase consumers' willingness to pay for debit cards. On the other hand, POS terminals are a substitute for ATMs because they offer consumers an alternative means of payment. The effects of omitting POS terminals would depend on the correlation between the within-firm (log) change in POS availability and our variables of interest.
While we do not possess data on POS availability, we do observe POS transactions per card for our set of issuers. In unreported results, we have estimated models that include the level or log of POS transactions per card, as well as interaction terms between POS usage and the ATM-related variables. The results are not statistically significant. Moreover, including the POS variables does not affect the sign or significance of the ATM-related variables.
Endogeneity
The unobserved portion of quality that remains in the error term, ∆ξ jkt , is likely to be correlated with the price variable p jt and the within-nest market shares j|g . Increases in unobserved quality will likely be correlated with both increases in price and within group share. We account for this following Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) by using costs and competitors' characteristics as instruments. 21 We discuss robustness of our results to different sets of instruments below. Table 2 lists yearly trends for the primary variables used in our analysis. In addition to the variables discussed above, we also define a set of bank-level variables capturing other characteristics associated with deposit accounts, for inclusion in the x jkt vector. These variables follow closely the set used in other structural demand studies in banking. 22 We use county-level branches to measure convenience of access to non-ATM related services. We use employees per branch and salaries per employee to capture service quality. We measure the number of counties in which a bank operates, in order to allow willingness to pay to depend on the geographic breadth of a bank's operations. The average number of counties that a bank has branches in increases dramatically over the sample. This is the result of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 that relaxed interstate branching restrictions. Finally, we define two dummy variables indicating whether the bank offers complementary services: money market accounts, and brokerage services. We would expect that increases in any of these variables would increase consumers' willingness to pay for accounts.
Variables and Descriptive Statistics
While we do not present the results here, in related work [Knittel and Stango (2007) ] we examine our summary data in more detail in order to highlight the variation in our data that drives identification. In that work we observe two general trends. First, much of the within-firm increases in ATM density (and competitors' ATMs) appear to be accompanied by increased prices on deposit accounts. This pattern is in fact suggested by the data in Table 2 as well. Furthermore, we observe that the greatest changes in behavior occur for (a) large rather than small banks, and (b) urban rather than rural banks. In that analysis and that in Knittel and Stango (2006), we define "large" based on local market share. Thus, it is possible that a bank that is large nationally may be considered small, if it is not dominant in its local markets. We also find in Knittel and Stango (2006) that banks with large local market shares and greater incentives for "strategic incompatibility" in their ATM/deposit account markets are those that increase their ATM fleet sizes by the most between 1996 and 1999. There is relatively minor variation in foreign fees with unobserved deposit account quality. The competitors' characteristics include offerings of brokerage services and money market accounts, which will vary by bank/county/year. This implicitly assumes that competitors' characteristics are exogenous from any one bank's perspective. 22 Dick (2002) is the first work to employ many of these variables.
or competitors' surcharges across these categories, although larger banks are more likely to impose surcharges themselves (thereby increasing competitors' surcharges for all other banks in the market). Interestingly, during all of these changes within-firm market shares are relatively stable, with the exception of small urban banks, who appear to lose some ground relative to large urban banks. Table 3 reports the results from three specifications estimating equation (7). These results are nearly identical to those from the specifications that use alternative measures of incompatibility (See Table A3 ). This is not surprising; most of the within-firm variation in f jt + E (sc −j,kt ) stems from variation in E (sc −j,kt ), as firms do not change their foreign fees very much. Similarly, most of the variation in E (sc −j,kt ) is fairly discrete and occurs in 1997 as firms initially adopt surcharging. The first specification uses OLS and ignores the endogeneity of prices and within-nest market share. The second specification instruments for prices and within-nest market share. The third specification implements the Error-in-Variables Instrumental Variable (EIV-IV) specification. Patterns across the specifications seem sensible. The price coefficient grows more negative when we move to the IV specifications. The coefficients on the variables measured with error change significantly moving from the IV to EIV-IV specifications, and for the most part in an intuitive way. We expect that the competitors' ATMs and competitors' surcharges variables are measured with relatively more error than own ATMs; indeed, these coefficients change the most, and the EIV-IV estimates are farther away from zero.
Results
Most of the coefficients on the x jkt follow an intuitive pattern. Utility for deposit accounts increases with the number of branches, employees per branch, salary per employee and number of counties in which a bank operates. The dummy variables indicating complementary service offerings are not statistically significant, although in most specifications the coefficients are of the expected signs. The σ t coefficient falls over time, suggesting that the inside and outside goods become closer substitutes; this is in line with anecdotal evidence suggesting that credit unions have become closer substitutes to commercial banks.
The coefficient associated with price represents the marginal utility of income, and allows us to interpret the other coefficients. It also allows us to calculate the firm-level price elasticity of demand; we show summary data re-garding these elasticity estimates in Table A5 . The estimates are generally quite low, lying near one for most banks. One possible explanation for this is the significant anecdotal evidence that banks use checking account prices as loss leaders, in order to engage in cross-marketing for loan and other financial service products.
In order to clarify the economic interpretation of our results regarding the strength of network effects, we discuss them here in terms of price changes that would leave consumers indifferent to a given change in ATMs or incompatibility. Within this context we find that the indirect network effect between a bank's own ATM density and willingness to pay is strong; in exchange for a fifty percent increase in own ATMs, the average consumer is willing to pay deposit account prices that are roughly seven percent higher. The effect of competitors' ATMs (absent fees) is also economically significant; for a similar fifty percent increase in competitors' ATMs the mean consumer would pay deposit fees nearly thirteen percent higher. 23 We also find significant effects of incompatibility. As the costs associated with using foreign ATMs increase, the value associated with competitors' ATMs falls. At the typical foreign cost of $3.00, a proportional increase in competitors' ATMs is worth three-quarters as much as when these costs are zero. At a combined (foreign plus surcharge) cost of twelve dollars, the typical customer derives no value at all from competitors' ATMs-meaning that this level of incompatibility eliminates the indirect network effect.
Surcharging and Consumer Welfare
The parameter estimates from the structural model allow us to discuss changes in welfare more broadly, considering shift in product attributes following 1996-in particular, any increase in ATM deployment associated with the shift to incompatibility. Although growth in ATMs seems to have accelerated after 1996, our data make obtaining a precise estimate of the causal link between surcharging and ATM growth difficult. Essentially, we have six observations for each county, reducing our ability to build a structural model linking ATM deployment to surcharging in any realistic way. Our approach is therefore to construct conservative estimates of post-1996 ATM growth. We then ask whether these conservative estimates are large enough to materially offset the 23 It may seem odd that an equal percentage increase in competitors' ATMs would be worth more than in own ATMs-but the base level of competitors' ATMs is much higher, meaning that it is a significantly larger increase in the total number of ATMs. Given the parameter estimates, consumers are always willing to pay more for an additional own rather than competitors' machine. reduced welfare associated with incompatibility. We also compare our conservative estimates to those estimated by Gowrisankaran and Krainer (2004) and Hannan and Borzekowski (2006) .
A simple way of estimating how surcharging changed ATM deployment is to model ATM growth as a trend with a post-1996 shift. To make the estimate of the post-1996 shift as conservative as possible, we estimate a loglinear specification; this assumes that absent any effect of surcharging, ATM deployment increases at an increasing rate (exponentially) over time. For each ATM related variable (own ATMs, competitors' ATMs, and the incompatibility/competitors' ATM interaction) we estimate:
The parameter α 1 is the pre-1997 annual percentage change in the variable of interest, while α 2 , α 3 and α 4 are the cumulative changes in this growth for 1997, 1998 and 1999. Again, given our log-linear specification these are conservative estimates that estimate post-1996 increases in the exponential growth rate. 24 We estimate three variations of equation (10). The first is a fixed effect regression at the bank/county level. Table 4 In the second specification, we allow growth rates to vary by state by estimating equation (10) for each state in our sample, pooling the bank/county observations. While this adds noise to our detrended growth rates, it allows for state level variation in the growth rates. Finally, we estimate equation (10) at the county level. The means of the state-and county-level estimates are similar to the aggregate measure reported in Table 4 .
In Table 5 , we use the parameters from Table 3 and our estimates of the increase in ATM deployment to calculate the change in consumer welfare over the period 1994-1999. Because we have estimates of the marginal utility asso-ciated with both ATMs and incompatibility, we can use these parameters and estimates of changes in the ATM/incompatibility variables to calculate utility changes for the typical consumer. We provide both the partial effects of incompatibility holding ATM deployment constant, and fuller estimates incorporating the welfare gains from increased deployment. We present aggregate, state-level and within-county estimates. The aggregate estimates use the parameters from Table 5 , and fix the changes in ATM-related variables at their sample mean values. The within-state and within-county estimates use the individual state-or county-level parameters, which we do not show to save space. We present both dollar value and percentage figures. The dollar value numbers can be used to calculate actual compensating variation from incompatibility. Because price is defined in terms of deposits, we require an assumption regarding the deposit amount of the consumer; the typical consumer holds $1600 in transaction balances over the year. Thus, finding that incompatibility reduced welfare by $0.0051 implies an annual cost of $8.16-or, roughly the cost of four foreign ATM transactions per year. On balance, the partial effects amount to a reduction in consumer welfare equivalent to an increase in deposit fees of roughly nine percent (or nine dollars per customer per year). Greater ATM deployment during our sample period increases consumer welfare. However, an unweighted average across our observation still shows the a reduction in consumer welfare equivalent to a 4-6% increase in deposit fees.
To provide some evidence on cross-market differences, Figure 1 shows a kernel density estimate of the percentage change in welfare from 1994 to 1999 for all counties in our sample, using the county specific estimates of ATM growth rates. The figure shows both the partial and full estimates. The full estimates vary widely because we estimate significant variations across counties in the post-1996 shift in ATM deployment, and are positive for a substantial share of counties. Some of this heterogeneity may simply reflect noise in our estimates of county level changes. Nonetheless, it seems clear that there are some counties in which ATM deployment expanded extremely rapidly, and perhaps rapidly enough that the gains from increased deployment may have offset the effects of incompatibility. Many of these areas are urban markets; the mean post-1996 percentage shift in ATM deployment (due to surcharging) is close to zero in non-MSA counties, and nearly thirty percent in MSA counties. To understand the relationship between welfare changes and population density, Figure 2 plots our estimated county-level welfare changes against the natural logarithm of county population density. The figure also includes a non-parametric Lowess smoothed line. There appears to be a significant positive relationship between the two and the non-parametric line is positive for population density levels above 400. A simple linear regression confirms this, yielding the following estimated relationship:
UtilChgP ercent k = −0.329 + 0.056 ln(P opDens k ) (11) (0.028) (0.005) While this estimate is admittedly rough, it predicts negative welfare effects for any county with population density below 356 persons per square mile-a figure typical of such medium-sized metropolitan areas as Kalamazoo county (Michigan) and Palm Beach county (Florida). Of the roughly nine hundred counties in our sample, over six hundred fall below this level. Another way of interpreting the results is that in a sparsely populated area such as Des Moines county (Iowa) with a population density of roughly 100 people per square mile, the model implies a welfare change of negative seven percentwhile in a densely populated area such as Montgomery county (Maryland) with 1500 people per square mile, the model implies a welfare change of positive seven percent. Again, these results are true using a conservative estimate of shifts in deployment. If the actual shift induced by surcharging were greater a wider range of counties would experience a net increase in welfare. Given the estimated utility parameters, for the average observed change in surcharges and level of competitors' ATMs, ATM growth rates above 24 percent yield a positive welfare change. Furthermore, as we stated above our ATM figures omit those deployed by ISOs; ISO ATM deployment would also increase consumer welfare.
The above results regarding population density depend solely on differences in ATM deployment across markets, but it is also possible that demand parameters vary across markets. In particular, it seems likely that areas with high population density have higher travel costs. This might increase consumers' willingness to pay for ATM services, since using ATMs involves traveling to them. To analyze the effects of travel costs further, we estimate equation (7) separately for counties above and below the median population density level. Lower travel costs should reduce the importance of ATM density as well as reduce the surcharge level for which competitor's ATMs are no longer valued. The results for the ATM variables are reported in Table 6 . In low population density markets, the value placed on ATMs is much lower and not statistically significant, while the "break even" foreign cost falls to under three dollars. In contrast, high density markets place a greater weight on ATMs and competitors' ATMs are valued even with very high foreign costs. 25 These are results are consistent with Knittel and Stango (2007) , which suggests the bulk of the reduced form correlation between prices and ATM density is driven by observations from high density markets. Table 7 repeats the welfare calculation using these parameters, while Figure 3 plots these welfare changes versus the log of population density for the base and split-sample models; the results are striking. Consumers in high travel cost counties experience substantially higher welfare after 1996, while the net effect remains negative for consumers in low travel cost counties. While we repeat the caveat that these calculations ignore any shifts in the intensity of price competition following surcharging, these results do suggest that surcharging may have a positive effect on consumer welfare, especially if we focus on a population weighted average of consumer welfare.
Alternative Specifications
Tables A1-A4 report the results of the robustness checks we mention earlier in the paper. Table A1 compares EIV/non-EIV results from counties in which we observe relatively complete ATM data to those in which we observe less complete data. One could also use the completeness of the data-for example, the fraction of banks in the local market for which we observe data-analogously to a "reliability ratio," which can be used in corrections for attenuation bias. However, such corrections maintain the assumption that the actual measurement error is correlated with this share (which we expect but can not confirm), while the Lewbel (1997) procedure makes no assumptions regarding which observations display the greatest error. Presumably, the measurement error (particularly in competitors' ATMs) is greater in the latter counties. If true, this would imply a greater relative impact of the EIV correction. We find evidence in favor of this: in counties with relatively complete data EIV results are fairly similar to non-EIV results, while in counties with incomplete data this is not true. This suggests that our EIV-IV approach is correcting at least some of the bias.
with population density.
We next estimate the model using different imputation methods for competitors' ATMs. These results are described and reported in Table A2 . The results are robust to these alternative imputation methods, as are the welfare estimates. We also test the robustness of our results to the incompatibility measure, presenting these results in Table A3 . While the standard errors are larger when using these alternative measures, the general pattern of the coefficients is unchanged. Finally, Table A4 reports results using subsets of our instruments rather than the full set. The second column uses only the BLP instruments, while the third uses only the cost shifters. This addresses the concern that either competitors' characteristics or our cost shifters are themselves endogenous (though it does not address the concern that both are endogenous).
A final robustness check, which we do not report to conserve space, involves the sensitivity of our welfare estimates to our estimated post-1996 changes in ATM deployment. Recall that in high-density markets we estimate a thirty percent increase in ATMs due to surcharging, and in low-density markets essentially no change. Aggregate data show that for the country as a whole, detrended ATM deployment increased by nineteen percent after 1996. This is roughly consistent with our estimated increases: with a share of ATMs in high-density markets equal to 0.70 (again, a reasonable figure given aggregate data), our estimates imply a twenty-one percent increase in ATMs overall. This is close to the aggregate figure of nineteen percent, but may be slightly high. To check the robustness of our results to lower assumed ATM growth in high-density markets, we have also calculated welfare changes in high-density markets for growth rates of 21, 24 and 27 rather than 30 percent. These figures yield welfare changes of +5%, +7% and +9% percent in high-density markets, figures that are still quite strongly positive; any growth rate above 13 percent yields a positive welfare change.
Conclusions
In this paper, we estimate the importance of network effects and incompatibility in a classic "hardware/software" industry: Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) and ATM cards. Our empirical setting represents a rare opportunity to measure a relatively discrete change in incompatibility between cards and ATMs. We estimate a structural model of consumer demand for deposit accounts (ATM cards), allowing demand to depend not only on prices and characteristics directly associated with the account, but also on the ATM services provided indirectly with the account.
We find that ATM-related services play an important role in consumer behavior regarding deposit accounts. A bank's own ATMs significantly affect the demand for its deposit account services. We also find a strong indirect network effect; consumers' willingness to pay for deposit accounts is affected as well by the availability of competitors' ATMs in the local market. This suggests that other research examining ATM fees should consider the interplay between ATM fees, ATM deployment and the demand for complementary deposit account services.
Our particular focus is the extent to which the direct welfare losses from incompatibility may be offset by changes in product attributes. Surcharging significantly reduces the indirect network effect associated with competitor ATMs. Even under conservative assumptions about post-1996 ATM growth, however, increased deployment offsets this loss. In general, the largest marketswhich also have higher population density-experience increased welfare. This result is consistent with our demand estimates, which show that consumers value ATMs more highly in dense areas; it therefore seems sensible that we would observe the greatest increase in deployment in those area. It is possible that this result would be even stronger if we considered the impact of (unobserved) ATM deployment by ISOs, who typically concentrate their ATMs in metropolitan areas. One limitation of the analysis is that we lack sufficient data to also incorporate changes in point-of-sale (POS) terminals allowing ATM card use at retail establishments over the same period. Given that POS terminal deployment also increased rapidly, and that some of this increase may have stemmed from the advent of surcharging, it is likely that our model underestimates the increase in welfare.
This result has important implications for the policy debate in ATM markets, and also furthers our understanding of the relationship between incompatibility and consumer welfare more generally. To reprise the analogy from our introduction, it suggests that the competition between incompatible platforms may benefit rather than harm consumers. Consumers can not mix and match hardware and software in such cases, which is surely harmful. However, this arrangement may increase platform owners' incentives to vertically integrate and invest in developing high-quality software.
Some open questions do remain. The social optimality of incompatible competition is something we do not explore. It is possible, for example, that the shifts in product attributes associated with incompatibility are inefficient even though they benefit consumers. Another open issue is the relationship between incompatibility and the intensity of price competition, an issue we do not explore in this paper but which may be important.
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